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Reforming Incentive 
Schemes under Political 
Constraints: 
The Physician Agency 
Gabrielle D?mange, Pierre Yves Geoffard* 
ABSTRACT. - In many developed countries attempts to reform physicians 
payment schemes have failed. To analyze some of the difficulties, this paper 
studies reforms of payment schemes in situations such as the physician 
agency, where the quality of the good produced is imperfectly observable 
by the payer. We first study the situation, common in many countries, where 
physicians face a single scheme. We identify conditions under which no 
reform can both obtain the consent of a large proportion of physicians 
(political constraints) and improve patients welfare. We then study whether 
a menu of contracts, with or without cross subsidies, may solve the 
difficulties generated by the heterogeneity of producers practice. 
Modes de r?mun?ration des m?decins et pouvoir 
de blocage 
R?SUM?. - Dans de nombreux pays, les r?formes visant ? modifier les 
modes de r?mun?ration des prescripteurs de soins se sont heurt?es ? leur 
forte opposition. Ce papier analyse ces difficult?s, d'abord dans un cadre 
de monopole puis de concurrence r?gul?e entre diff?rentes organisations. 
Quelques facteurs clefs sont mis en ?vidence : ils sont li?s au pouvoir 
politique des m?decins, ? l'h?t?rog?n?it? de leurs caract?ristiques et de 
leurs comportements. 
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1 Introduction 
A major challenge faced by health systems is the regulation of medical practice. 
Quality of medical care is at least partly unobservable, and the output of medi 
cal services cannot be contracted upon. This has justified public interventions that 
prevent the price of medical care, and especially physician payment schemes, to 
be determined by market forces. However, regulation has also led to a situation in 
which physicians have a strong political power, in addition to the rents they may 
hold thanks to their informational advantage. In many developed countries the last 
twenty years have witnessed various attempts to reform some medical professions, 
many of which have failed. The aim of this paper is to investigate how the political 
power combines with the informational rents held by physicians to impose con 
straints on payment schemes reforms. 
The premise of our analysis is that medical practice reacts to monetary incen 
tives, as documented by growing empirical research. Recent evidence points out 
that general practitioners increase their working time when the payment scheme 
provides an incentive to do so; see Delattre and Dormont (2000), Croxson et al. 
(2002), and McGuire (2000). The same holds true for inpatient care: monetary 
incentives of physicians (surgeons, obstetricians) condition the rate of several sur 
gical procedures; see Gruber and Owings (1996), Holly et al. (1998). Thus, pay 
ment schemes affect quality of care, overall welfare, and how this overall welfare 
is distributed among all agents (patients, doctors). 
The history of health systems reforms also stresses that such reforms are difficult 
to implement if they do not obtain the support of health care professionals, and in 
particular of physicians. Not surprisingly, this is especially true when the proposed 
reform aims to modify physician payment schemes which, potentially, may affect 
physicians income and welfare. Kessel (1958) and especially Havighurst (1978) 
provide a description of physicians historical reluctance to prepaid group practices. 
More recently and in a European perspective, Hassenteufel (1997) gives a detailed 
account of the various ways in which physicians have reacted against supply-side 
cost sharing1. This hostility may be due to risk aversion of physicians. Indeed, 
supply-side cost sharing transfers some of the health risk to physicians: when they 
face more severe or more complex cases, they may have to spend more time with 
their patient; if the payment scheme does not compensate for this additional time, 
physicians partly bear the risk to face a sicker clientele. The political power of 
physicians was also a key element in the history of the Medicare program in the US 
(Corning, 1969). A strong opposition by the American Medical Association to the 
so-called "socialized medicine" delayed the introduction of the federally funded 
program; eventually, a generous fee for service was set to obtain the agreement of 
the AMA to the reform. Recently, Swiss doctors organizations have successfully 
petitioned against the possibility of selective contracting. 
In short, no reform is politically feasible without the support of a large share 
of physicians. Obtaining this support involves transfers of some of the efficiency 
1. For example, in 1913, most german physicians went on strike (against the health insurance funds of 
that time) to obtain a fee-for-service payment scheme as well as freedom for patients to choose their 
provider. 
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gains to those who are threatened to lose their rents. Hence, less gains accrue to 
the rest of society. This paper investigates the following issue. Under which condi 
tions can a reform produce sufficient efficiency gains so that, once physicians are 
compensated for their diminished rents, patients are still better off? 
Our analysis builds on contract theory. Neither the quality of the service provided 
by a physician, nor his "talent", nor the health status of his patients are observed. 
Physicians are paid through contracts, or reward schemes, according to some 
observable input (say, the number of acts or the total time spent with the patient) 
that influence the (unobservable) quality they offer. Hence, even though physicians 
are concerned with the quality of the service, a potential conflict between reducing 
costs and guaranteeing quality may arise. 
In the initial situation (the status quo) all physicians face a single payment scheme, 
assumed to be inefficient. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to address, in a 
theoretical set up, the problems faced by public policies which aim to reform such 
payment mechanisms. 
We first study "uniform" reforms, which aims to modify this unique scheme. Our 
analysis derives three elements that may limit the possibility of a reform that would 
increase patients welfare: heterogeneity of physician practice, important political 
power of physicians, and low elasticity of physician practice time. 
We then investigate a situation in which a single insurance fund introduces sev 
eral contracts. Cross-subsidies can compensate for differences in cost and quality 
across contracts, and alleviate the constraints associated with pure competition. In 
such a case, the introduction of contracts in addition to the status quo one may both 
keep all physicians at least as well off (hence be politically feasible) and improve 
patients welfare. 
Finally, we turn to more drastic reforms, that introduce some form of managed 
competition among private insurance companies. Such reforms have been recently 
undertaken in European countries (the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland). In 
some cases, insurance funds often do not have to contract with all providers of 
care, hospitals and physicians2. Selective contracting goes along with a variety of 
contractual arrangements between providers of care and insurance funds, including 
various payment schemes3. In our setup, insurance funds have to compete on both 
sides, to attract physicians (through payment schemes) as well as patients (through 
premiums). Double-sided competition in contracts under imperfectly observable 
quality blends elements of adverse selection ? la Rothschild-Stiglitz on the physi 
cian side, and of product differentiation ? la Hotelling on the patient side. Since 
patients can infer some information about quality by observing physicians choice 
of contract, this double-sided competition imposes strong constraints on the strate 
gies, and we show that no competitive Nash equilibrium exists. 
Our analysis extends the literature in two aspects. First, in the contract theory lit 
erature, political constraints differ from participation constraints in standard prin 
cipal-agent models (see, e.g. Laffont and Tir?le, 1993). Second, within the health 
economics literature, our analysis is an attempt to study simultaneously the three 
nodes of the Arrow (1963) "medical triad." Most analysis to date has focused either 
on the supply side, by investigating the relationship between insurance funds and 
2. In the Netherlands, selective contracting was introduced by the Dekker plan; in Switzerland, it is a 
key feature of the current revision of the Health Insurance Law. 
3. In the realm of Managed Care in the U.S., capitation contracts are standard in IPA or network HMOs, 
whereas physicians are paid on wage in Group/Staff HMOs. 
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physicians, or on the demand side, by investigating the risk and incentives faced by 
patients. However, the way supply-side and demand-side regulation interact is not 
well understood (Blomqvist, 1991; Ma and McGuire, 1997; McGuire, 2000). 
Section 2 introduces the model of physician agency in which quality of service 
(health improvement) is not contractible, but some input (time) is. Section 3 studies 
optimal contracts as a benchmark for section 4, in which political constraints are 
introduced, and deviations from first best efficiency are analyzed. Section 5 studies 
the situation with many contracts, firstly under cross subsidies and lastly in a com 
petitive setting. Section 6 concludes and section 7 gathers all the proofs. 
2 The Market for Care and Health 
Insurance 
This section describes the main features of the market for care considered in this 
paper. It studies how income and incentives to provide quality are affected by the 
reward scheme faced by a physician. Physicians preferences over alternative pay 
ment schemes, which have implications on reforms, are derived. 
2.1 The Physician-Patient Relationship 
A patient who suffers from an illness episode meets a physician. The outcome of 
the service, denoted by /, is referred to as the "quality" of care. We follow a stan 
dard assumption in the health economics literature devoted to the physician agency 
(Blomqvist, 1991; McGuire, 2000) by assuming that quality is a non-contractible 
input in the health production function. 
More precisely, quality of care depends on two main elements. First, given the 
symptoms expressed by the patient, the physician must set a diagnosis. Second, 
based upon this diagnosis, the physician prescribes some treatment. Quality of care 
depends on the accuracy of the diagnosis, and on the adequateness of the treatment 
to clinical guidelines based upon existing medical evidence; both elements are nec 
essary (i.e. complement) for good care. We assume that the first element depends 
on the total time t spent by the physician with the patient, during one or more 
visits, with positive and decreasing returns. Ma and McGuire (1997) argue that the 
quantity of treatment (which includes the time spent with each patient) is costly to 
observe by the insurer, and reports may not be truthful. However, simple mecha 
nisms may be implement to circumvent this problem. For instance, in Switzerland, 
physicians payments depend on the time spent with each patient. At the end of each 
visit, the physician notifies the length of the visit to the patient (who can easily 
monitor the truthfulness of the report). Thus, we assume that this input variable / is 
observable by the insurer at no cost4. 
4. If distinctions can be made on other criteria, our argument is valid for each category of physicians 
sharing the same criteria: in as much as quality is partially observed through a parameter, contracts 
should be interpreted as being conditional on each value of this parameter. 
REFORMING INCENTIVE SCHEMES UNDER POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 225 
Quality is also affected by the health shock the patient has been subject to, 
denoted by 6. A higher 6 indicates a more severe (or more complex) case. Clinical 
examination may be more difficult, and the physician may be less familiar with 
some diseases and their treatments. This affects both elements of quality, and there 
fore / is decreasing with 6. Finally, quality of care also depends on an exogenous 
characteristic ? e B = [/?,/?] that is specific to each physician. We call ? the tal 
ent. Talent may also affect both elements of quality: more talented physicians may 
reach a correct diagnosis more rapidly; they may also have a better knowledge of 
clinical guidelines. In both cases, we assume that quality increases with ?. In sum 
mary, the production function l{t,6,?) for quality satisfies: 
Positive and decreasing returns: lt > 0,ltt < 0 
More severe patients need more time: le < 0 
Increasing quality with ?\ L > 0. 
The cross effect of input time / and talent ? is less clear. When talent is associ 
ated with a better knowledge of medical literature, time and talent are complement, 
since both are needed to obtain a good quality. When talent is associated with the 
ability to reach an accurate diagnosis, time and talent may rather be substitute. 
Hence, we allow both possibilities and will study these two cases; however, we 
shall assume a Spence-Mirrlees condition which ensures that lt is monotone in tal 
ent. Talent and time are either substitutes if for all {t,9,?), li? < 0, or complements 
if for all {t,6,?), lt? > 0. This will obviously affect how the total time supplied by 
each physician depends on his own characteristic ?. 
Patients value quality with linear preferences: XI is the monetary value for qual 
ity. Put differently, X represents the willingness to pay for a marginal increase in 
quality /. Information about the physician a patient is matched with, as well as 
about his own health status, is defined below. 
Throughout the paper, we shall assume that a physician knows his own charac 
teristic; for short a/^-physician denotes a physician with characteristic ?. For each 
patient, the input decision / is taken by a physician after he observes the health sta 
tus 6. Accordingly, it is a function of the two parameters {6,?\ and of the reward 
scheme the physician is facing. 
A physician receives a monetary payment for each of his patients. This payment 
is function of the observable variable / only, which is the total time (or the num 
ber of acts) spent by this physician with this patient. Hence, a reward scheme is 
specified by a function of/, R{t). We focus the analysis on linear reward schemes, 
given by 
R{t) 
= b + at, 
where b is a flat payment, and a a fee-for-service rate (restricting to linear schemes 
is justified later on). A capitation (prospective) contract is associated with a flat 
scheme a = 0 and a constant fixed payment per patient b > 0, and a purely retro 
spective scheme with b = 0 and a fee for service rate a > 0. 
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Physicians objective functions are a matter of debate within the health econom 
ics literature (McGuire, 2000). However, it is generally assumed that, even though 
physicians care for their monetary income, they also care for quality. Thus we 
assume that the objective function of a physician of type ?, who spends a time t 
with a patient with a health status 0 is given by: 
(1) b + at-wt + al{t;09?) 
Preferences are additive in money. The parameter w is the constant marginal 
opportunity cost of time. The quality of service also enters the objective func 
tion of the physician, with a weight a. The parameter a, which represents the con 
cern for quality, is assumed here to be identical across physicians5. This may be 
interpreted as an ethical norm inducing a concern for the quality of his service 
(Evans, 1974; Gruber and Owings, 1996). Another interpretation is that patients 
can partially observe quality (at least ex post); in case of a poor service, they may 
threaten to search for another provider, or share the information with other patients. 
In both cases, a lower quality diminishes the physician future income (Pauly and 
Satterthwaite, 1981; Rochaix, 1989; Dranove, 1988)6. Notice that this concern for 
quality should not be interpreted as altruism. A perfectly altruistic physician would 
value his patient's total utility, and thus would also care for the cost of care borne 
by the patient (either through direct payments or, here, through insurance premi 
ums). 
Facing a reward scheme R, the optimal time taken by a /^-physician after he 
observes the health status 6 is characterized by the first order condition7: 
(2) R'{i) 
= a = w = alt {t;0,?), 
which equates the marginal revenue to the marginal net cost, including the concern 
for quality. We shall denote it by t*{a;0,?) . Notice that it depends on the fee a, 
but not on the flat payment b. 
Increasing the marginal reward a makes the scheme more powerful in the sense that 
incentives to spend more time and therefore to improve quality are increased8. 
5. One could slightly change the interpretation of the talent parameter so as to allow for different levels 
of concern. We may indeed assume that / writes as l(t;0, ?)= ?l (t',0), in which the ?(t;6) is the 
quality of the service. 
6. Such an assumption is a common feature in all supplier-induced-demand models, since the induction 
power must be limited by some cost of inducing unnecessary care. 
7. Thanks to decreasing returns in time, the objective is concave with respect to t. Hence, the optimal 
time is unique. Moreover, under standard continuity assumptions, the supremum is reached. Notice 
that, since quality of care enters his objective, a physician may provide care even when the fee a is 
lower than the opportunity cost of time w. If the concern for quality a and the marginal effect of time 
lt are very large, it could even be the case that physicians would be willing to pay to treat patients. We 
implicitly assume that a is sufficiently small to rule out such a case. 
8. This terminology is to be contrasted with a large branch of the Health Economics literature, which is 
concerned with cost efficiency issues, especially in hospital care. In such a context a fully prospective 
payment is a high-powered scheme: letting aside the quality problem and assuming it to be fixed, a 
prospective payment induces the hospital to minimize its cost, in contrast to a cost-based reimburse 
ment; see, e.g., Newhouse (1996). Our assumptions also lead to the standard feature that labour 
supply (here, /*) increases with its reward a, in contrast with the "target income" hypothesis (Fuchs, 
1978). 
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2.2 Health Organizations 
We have just described the relationship between a physician with a given charac 
teristic ? and a patient with a given health status 0. We now specify the distribution 
of these characteristics over the population, and how patients and physicians are 
matched. 
The total number of physicians is normalised to 1: the population of physicians 
is indexed by j e J, uniformly distributed over J = [0,1]; the type of physiciany is 
?3 e B. The induced probability distribution of types, denoted by F, admits a posi 
tive density/over [/?,/?]. 
The total number of patients is n, which is also the average number of patients 
per physician. The type of patient i e I = [0,n] is denoted by 0r It is drawn from 
an identical probability distribution G with density g, and is unknown by the patient 
ex ante. 
Even though health care is a service provided by a physician to a patient, the 
monetary payments associated with this service are channelled through a health 
insurance organization (HO). This organization may be a private for-profit or 
non-profit firm, or a public fund, and may operate in a competitive or a regulated 
environment. Since patients are ex ante identical9, each one pays a premium inde 
pendent of his health condition, which is unknown at the time of the subscription. 
Patients consult their physician whenever they "need", i.e. when they are subject 
to a health shock 0 large enough. Patients and physicians are matched together 
by the organization to which they subscribe for a given period, say a year. Up to 
section 5, we consider the situation of a public monopolistic health organization, 
which offers a unique reward scheme. At the initial situation, the reward scheme in 
place is denoted by R? = (a?,b? ) and called the status-quo. 
All patients subscribe to the HO, and all physicians are registered with it. So the 
HO does not play much role apart from choosing the reward scheme R that applies 
to all physicians and the premium p that is collected from each patient. Monetary 
transfers are operated without cost. 
Patients are randomly matched to physicians: ex ante, the case mix, i.e., the 
distribution of 0, faced by each physician is G, the same for all physicians, and 
the number of patients per physician (the clientele size) is the same for all phy 
sicians, equal to n, the overall ratio of number of patients to number of physi 
cians. 
9. Our focus is on the supply side, and the demand side is very sketchy. In particular, we do not consider 
patients selection (see, e.g., Newhouse, 1996), nor demand side moral hazard issues (for a recent sur 
vey on patient demand, see Zweifel and Manning, 2000). This is roughly the situation of a complete 
insurance contract, consumers paying an overall fixed premium independently of the number of their 
visits (but the premium possibly depends on their revenue). However, the insurance is not "ideal" in 
the sense of Arrow (1963): consumers still bear a risk in terms of quality of care and, eventually, in 
terms of health outcome. 
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2.3 Physicians and Patients Preferences over Reward 
Schemes 
At the time a reform is contemplated, each physician knows his own characteris 
tic ?, and evaluates whether he will lose or gain from the reform. Both patients and 
physicians are risk neutral. 
A /^-physician evaluates a reward scheme R = {a,b) according to the expected 
value of his objective (1). Formally, preferences over reward schemes are repre 
sented by the indirect utility function V: 
(3) V{aM?) = [b + {a-w)T{a;?) + aL{a;?)]n, 
where T and L are the expected time and quality provided by a /^-physician facing 
a case mix10 G: 
(4) T{a;?) = Ee [t (a;0,?)], L{a;?) ^ E9\l[t (a;0,/?);?,/?)]. 
Ex ante, before the occurrence of a health shock 0, and having no information on 
the physician's type with which they are randomly matched ?, patients expected 
utility is given by: 
E?[zL(a;?)yp. 
Since both patients and physicians preferences are linear in money and the HO 
operates monetary transfers at no cost, the overall welfare is equal to the sum of 
patients and physicians utility, and of the HO profit. Since monetary transfers can 
cel out, the overall welfare derived from a linear contract {a, b) depends only on a 
and may be written as: 
(5) W{a) = nE?[w(a,?)]= \w{a,?)f{?)d? 
where 
(6) W{a,?) = {A + a)L{a,?)-wT{a,?) 
is the expected social surplus of a relation between a patient and a/?-physician who 
faces a rate a. Notice that the expected quality L is valued by the patient (weight X) 
as well as by the physician (weight a). If physicians were perfectly altruistic, then 
patients utility should not be counted twice (Jones-Lee, 1991), but in our set up a 
represents the physician's concern for quality: a better quality improves patients as 
well as physicians utility, and should therefore enter total welfare in both ways. 
10. To emphasize uncertainty, we denote a random variable by x, and its realization (when observed) 
by x. 
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3 Assessing the Need for a Reform 
To assess whether a reform is needed, it is useful to characterize a first best allo 
cation of time, without any constraint stemming from reward schemes and the non 
observability of the physicians characteristics. Still assuming random matching of 
patients with physicians, the ex ante welfare as function of the time spent by physi 
cians t{0,?), is equal to: 
nj?j0[(? 
+ 
a)l(t(a,?);U,?)-wt(0,?)]f(?)g(u)d?d?. 
Again transfers across physicians and consumers cancel out. A first best alloca 
tion of time maximizes the welfare criterion as given above. The solution is simply 
obtained by maximising over t, for each (#,/?), the surplus 
{? + a)l{t;0,?)-wt. 
This gives the optimal time tFB as a function of (#,/?), characterized by the first 
order condition: 
{A + a)lt{t;0,?)-w = O 
which equates the social marginal value for quality to the marginal cost. 
An immediate question is whether the optimal time tFB can be implemented 
through appropriate payment schemes. Comparing with the time allocated by a 
physician under a given payment scheme as given by (2), we readily obtain the 
following result: 
I Proposition I. Any scheme R that satisfies 
" 
M"""^) 
leads physicians to choose the optimal time tFB. We call such a scheme first best 
optimal. 
In our model a first best allocation can be obtained through a unique scheme: 
there is no reason, on efficiency grounds, to discriminate among the physicians11. 
Now the main question investigated in this paper is: how to improve upon a (not 
11. This is true because there is no heterogeneity in altruism. 
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first best) status-quo in a situation where physicians are reluctant to be hurt by a 
reform, are heterogeneous, and schemes cannot be made contingent on their char 
acteristics? 
The power of the physicians precisely comes from the possibility to block a 
reform. Political constraints will impose that a sufficiently large subgroup of physi 
cians benefits from the reform. If individual types were perfectly observed by the 
HO, flat payments could be designed in order to give each j3-physician a utility level 
at least equal to his status quo level. A first best scheme could be implemented, with 
all physicians supporting the reform. In particular, all efficiency gains could accrue 
to the consumers. Political constraints together with non observable characteristics 
distort from first best efficient allocations. By how much? 
4 Changing the Status Quo under 
Political Constraints 
We start with the situation where the HO is unique and benevolent. It aims to 
improve patient welfare by changing the status quo contract, and proposes a single 
scheme R that must satisfy two constraints. Firstly, R is budget balanced: 
(8) p = E^?[R(t(0,?))] 
= 
b^aE?[T(a;?)l 
This budget constraint links premiums and payment schemes. Hence, internal 
izing this constraint, patients utility is given by: 
U{a,b) = AE?[L(a;?)]-b-aE?[T(a;?)]. 
Secondly, R must be politically feasible: a large enough proportion q of the phy 
sicians, must accept the new scheme. This leads to the following definition. 
Definition 1. Given the status quo contract R?, a politically constrained optimum 
is given by a contract R = {a,b) that maximizes ex ante patient s utility U{a,b) 
over the politically feasible contracts, i.e. the contracts R that satisfy: 
(9) ?eB\V{R;?)>v(R?;?) >? 
Condition (9) states that to be politically feasible, a reform must be preferred 
to the current situation by a proportion of physicians at least equal to q, each one 
knowing his type. If unanimity is required, q = 1, each physician must be as well 
off as in the status quo. 
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To compare political constraints with standard participation constraints, it is nat 
ural to assume that the latter are met at the status quo: we have that WR?\?) > v 
for all ?. Therefore, under unanimity, political constraints are more demanding 
than participation constraints. If unanimity is not required, some schemes may be 
politically feasible without providing their reservation utility to each physician. 
Imposing participation constraints in addition to political ones can be easily han 
dled, but does not bring much additional insight. 
4.1 Politically Feasible Reforms 
To study politically feasible reforms, an analysis of physicians preferences 
over reward schemes is needed. Which physicians prefer more powerful reward 
schemes heavily depends on how the optimal time chosen by a physician varies 
with his type. 
Proposition 2. 
1. Let a scheme R be given. If talent and time are substitutes (resp. complements) 
optimal time t* {R,0,?) decreases (resp. increases) with ?. 
2. Let Rj be more powerful than R2: a] > a2, so that physicians spend more 
time, quality is higher if they face R? instead ofRT Then ifR} is preferred to R2 
by a ?-physician, it is also preferred by any physician who works more than him, 
i.e. by any ?'-physician with ?' < ? if talent and time are substitutes, or with 
?' > ? if complements. 
In words, property 1 says that in the substitute case, less talented doctors spend 
more time with their patients than more talented ones, and the opposite in the com 
plement case. Notice that in terms of quality, a change in ? has a direct positive 
effect {l?} and an indirect effect Iltt*? ). Whereas this indirect effect is positive in 
the complement case, it is negative in the substitute case and may dominate the 
direct effect. 
As for property 2, a scheme R? that is more powerful than another one R2 pro 
vides a larger variable reward to time-intensive practices. Therefore, thanks to the 
envelope theorem, if a physician prefers R? to R2, a fortiori any physician with a 
more intensive practice prefers it as well. 
Thanks to these properties, politically feasible linear schemes can be easily 
described through pivotal characteristics appropriately defined. Let a proposed 
reform {a,b) be less powerful than the status-quo la < a0 j. We know that if the 
reform is preferred by a physician with type ?, it is also preferred by any physician 
who works less. Hence, the pivotal characteristic is the value ?d such that the pro 
portion of physicians who work less than /^-physician is equal to q. If the reform 
aims to increase a, then the pivotal characteristic is the value j3" such that physi 
232 ANNALES D'ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 
cians who work more than the /?'-physician are in proportion q. Formally, we have 
the following definition: 
Definition 2. The pivotal characteristic12 ?c {a,b) for a reform {a,b) that 
aims to decrease (resp. increase) the fee for service, a<a , (resp. a>a? ) is ?f* 
(resp. ?'), as given by: 
F[?\T{a;?)<T(a;?d)yq 
and resp. F??\r{a;?)>T^a;?u>) =q. 
In the majority case, q = 1/2, the pivotal characteristic is identical whether the 
proposed reform decreases or increases incentives to work. A majority winner 
exists if physicians vote on a family of linear contracts j(a,&(a))j indexed by 
a (where b{a) can be supposed to be decreasing in a). This voting equilibrium 
contract is the one preferred by a /^-physician, where ?T is the median value of j3. 
The median type ?" is such that more time-intensive physicians (in the substitute 
case, higher values of ?) would favor an increase in a (given the function b{a) ), 
whereas less time-intensive physicians would prefer a larger fixed payment. 
Given the political power of physicians, however, a much larger support than 
majority may be needed. For q strictly larger than 1/2, the pivotal characteristics 
differ whether the proposal is less or more powerful, and we have for any a: 
T[a;?u)<T(a;?m)<T[a;?d). 
4.2 Second Best Optimal Reform 
The problem of finding a politically feasible reform that makes consumers better 
off can now be put in a simple form. 
A politically constrained optimum is given by a contract I ap ,bp J that solves 
(10) ?max?7(a,6) 
[(a,b) 
s.t. 
V(a,b;?c {a,b)) 
> 
v(a0,b?;?c {a,b)), 
with ?c {a,b) 
= 
?difa<a?, and ?c {a,b) 
= 
?uifa>a? 
12. The pivotal characteristic is defined in reference to the status quo. Since the status quo is fixed 
thoughout the paper we have dropped the argument (a?,b? ). The 
same remark applies for the com 
pensating variation b (a, ?) and informational cost C (a, ?) defined later on. 
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To analyze the impact of the constraints, it is convenient to write patients utility 
as the difference between the overall welfare criterion W{a), defined by (5), and 
the aggregate physicians utility. In terms of variation with respect to the status quo 
we have: 
n?U{a,b)-U(a?,b?)) = lw{a^ 
Whenever the status-quo differs from a first best scheme (a0 * aFB J, welfare 
W can be increased. To analyze the variation in physicians' utility, let b{a,?) 
be the flat payment that makes a /?-physieian indifferent between the new scheme 
{a,b{a,?)) and the status quo (a?,b?). Since the physician's utility is linear in 
money, it satisfies 
(11) V{aM?)-V(a?,b?;?} 
= 
n[b-b{a,?)]. 
The flat payment b{a,?) is the compensating variation associated with a 
change in the price of time from a0 to a. As said previously, the overall effi 
ciency gains would accrue to the consumers while providing each physician with 
his status quo utility level by giving contingent flat payments b{a,?) to each 
j3-physician. 
Under non contingent flat payments, changing a requires the flat payment b to be 
adjusted at b(a,?c) so as to "buy" the support of the pivotal physician. Therefore, 
we define the informational cost over all physicians as: 
C(a,?c)^E?[v(a,b-?)-V(a\b"',^ 
If unanimity is required, the informational cost is always positive, since 
b > b{a,?) for all ?. However, if q is small enough, the informational cost may be 
negative. For # = 1/2 for instance, C{a,?) is negative if the median value of b is 
smaller than the mean. 
Finally, the change in patients' utility associated to a change in the scheme can 
be expressed as 
(12) 
n^^(a,?)-C/(a^60)l 
= 
^^(a)-^(a0)l-C'(a,^c), 
which is the sum of an efficiency effect, as measured by the variation in welfare, 
and an informational cost. The following lemma derives the marginal effect of a 
on these terms. 
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Lemma 1. The marginal effects of changing the fee for service a on welfare Wand 
on informational cost C are given by: 
(13) Wa (a) = ?(??* ](ara -a)E?[t? (a,?)], 
and 
(14) Ca(a,?c) 
= 
n{E?[T(a,?)YT(a,?c)) for a*a? 
At a given fee a, the marginal welfare gains depend on how far from the first best 
a is, and on the responsiveness of average physician practice to monetary incen 
tives, E?\Ta (a, ?)]. 
The marginal informational cost is given by the spread between the average 
practice time and the one of the pivotal physician. If unanimity is required and 
a<a?, the pivotal physician, ?f1, is the one who spends the largest time; therefore, 
T(a,?d\>T{a,?) for any ?. Thus the marginal cost is negative for a<a?; simi 
larly it is positive for a > a : this corresponds to the intuition that the further away 
from the status-quo, the larger the information cost. Also, the more heterogeneity in 
physician time practice, the more important, in absolute terms, the marginal cost. 
A second best optimum trades off marginal welfare gains and marginal informa 
tional cost. According to expression (12) and lemma 1, patients' utility increases 
(resp. decreases) if 
(15) 
l^j(aFB-a) 
+ A(a,F) 
is positive (resp. negative) where 
T(a;?)-E?\T(a;?)] (16) A{a;?)= V '- ?l K ,j E, {r.M] 
and j8c is the pivotal characteristic, ?d or j8" depending on a being lower or greater 
than a0. Therefore, the discrepancy between the first best criteria and the second 
best one is summarized by the quantity Aya',?c j, which is interpreted after the 
following proposition. 
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Proposition 3. Two cases may occur: 
- 
either the situation is blocked at the status quo, ap 
= a , which occurs only if 
(17) 
A(a\fr)<(^)(a?-aFB)<A(a?,?d) 
- 
or ap satisfies: 
(18) a'=a 
+i??Afa'./F). 
The key point for understanding why blocking can occur is that the pivotal char 
acteristics differ whether less or more powerful contracts than the status quo are 
considered except: Technically, expression (15) is discontinuous at a0, meaning 
that patients utility presents a kink at the status quo. This is not true however if a 
simple majority is required, since then both pivotal characteristics coincide with 
the median one. A reform is politically feasible if it gives the median voter at least 
his status-quo utility level, so that a second best optimum maximises consumers 
surplus over the median physician indifference curve13. 
The features that determine whether the situation is blocked and the optimal 
scheme if it is not blocked are summarized through the function^. 
To fix the ideas, assume unanimity is required. Note that without heterogene 
ity, Ala;?d) would be null. With heterogeneity, the pivotal physician when a 
decreases is the one that works the more \T{a\?)<T\a\?d\\ hence A(a;?d) is 
positive. The quantity Ala;?d ) measures, in terms of fee for service, the impact of 
the heterogeneity of physicians: Ala;?d) approximates the raise in a that equal 
izes the average practice time to that of the pivotal physician T(a;?d\ To see 
this, let there be a change of the fee for service from a to a' = a + A? a;?d j. Then, 
assuming that the first order approximation is valid, the effect on the average prac 
tice time is given by: 
E?[T(a';?)]~E?[T(a;?)] + A(a;?c)E?[Ta(a;?)] 
= 
T(a;?<). 
13. Remark however that the contract chosen by the median voter, say (am,bm ) may well be less 
efficient than the current scheme: for example if a0 >aFB, the fee for service am may be larger 
than a?. If this occurs, the patient's welfare is increased at the expense of a larger loss incurred by 
physicians. 
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From (17), the larger the positive A(a;?d), and the smaller the negative 
Ala;?u j, the more likely it is that the situation is blocked. In absolute value, it 
increases with the difference between the practice time of the pivotal physician and 
the average practice time: this difference increases with heterogeneity of medical 
practice and with the power of physicians. Also it decreases with its responsive 
ness: if practice is not very responsive to monetary incentives: very large changes 
in a would be needed to obtain a desired change in practice time. 
Proposition does not characterize optima, and are only local. Finding general 
conditions under which expression (15) is well behaved are not easy. However, in 
some cases A is linear in a as in the following example. 
Example 1 Let us assume the following form for the quality function: 
l{t;0,?) = Vf{0,?), 
with 0 < y < 1, and f? < 0, f? 
> 0 (complements case). Easy computation gives 
that, facing a linear scheme R{t) 
= b + at, with b > 0 and a<w, optimal time is 
given by: 
t*{a,0,?) 
= ccyf{9,?) 
Taking expectation over the case mix distribution gives T {a, ?) 
= K {?){w 
- 
a)]~r, 
for some K{?) independent of a. The function^ writes as 
V } 
E[K{?)] V ' 
The closer the initial fee to marginal cost, the more elastic time practice to mon 
etary incentives (the closer y to 1 ), and the more likely the situation is blocked. 
To sum sup, our analysis identifies three features as sources for potential devi 
ations from first best efficiency: heterogeneity of medical practice, physicians 
political power, and elasticity of medical practice with respect to monetary incen 
tives. 
These results can be illustrated in the plan {a,b). By linearity in the flat pay 
ment, all indifference curves are obtained from each other by vertical transla 
tion. Using the envelope theorem, for a physician of type ?, the marginal rate of 
substitution between b (flat payment) and a (fee), Va/Vb, is equal to the expected 
time T{a;?). Since for any (#,/?), t* increases with a, indifference curves are 
concave. In the substitute (resp. complement) case, t* decreases (increases) with 
?, and therefore lower (resp. higher) ? correspond to steeper indifference curves. 
The set of politically feasible reforms presents a kink at la?,b?) whenever 
?>l/2. 
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Figure 1 
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|P[j8lna;j3)>na;?c)]=cr<^ 
small T 
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Patients indifference curves over payment schemes are also concave. Patients 
utility is always decreasing with b, but not with a: when a becomes small enough, 
the decrease in quality dominates the decrease in the associated payment14. 
If the situation is not blocked at status quo, the second best optimal scheme ap is 
such that patients indifference curve is tangent to the pivotal physician indifference 
curve. For q > 1/2, the kink at a0 in the set of politically feasible reforms may be 
such that no other feasible contract provides patients with a higher utility level. 
5 Menu of Plans 
The previous analysis considers a limited type of reform: a new scheme, if 
accepted, applies to each physician and replaces the status-quo. Since physicians 
heterogeneity is at the root of the difficulties, a solution could be to offer several 
distinct schemes within which physicians may choose. A situation with several 
active schemes may be the result of a competition game among distinct health 
organizations, or may be proposed by a unique one. 
Whatever the situation, we need first specify how patients and physicians allo 
cate themselves across the different proposed plans. 
may be positive when a < aFB. 
14. Formally, we have that Ub =-1, and Ua = 
^^\(aFB-a)E?\ra{aJ)\-Ep \r(aj)\. This last term 
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5.1 Equilibrium Allocations 
A plan specifies a scheme {a, b) to physicians, and a premium/? to be paid 
by patients. Let Uak,bk,pk),k e K> be the set of proposed plans by health 
organization(s). Each participant, physician or patient, chooses a single plan (exclu 
sive contract). Taking as given the plans, the resulting allocation of patients and 
physicians is determined under two basic assumptions: (I) free mobility accord 
ing to which patients and physicians can freely choose within the set of proposed 
plans and (2) rational expectations on the quality proposed by each plan and its 
clientele. 
Before going further, let us mention first a difficulty linked with coordination 
problems. Given a set of proposed plans, many outcomes are equilibria sustained 
by well chosen self fulfilling expectations. Suppose for instance that all patients 
choose the same plan. Then all physicians also pick that plan, which in turn justifies 
patients' choices. Some expectations solve this coordination problem in a reason 
able way, as we explain now. 
Let us say that physicians have homogeneous expectations if they expect the 
number of patients per physicians and the distribution of their health shocks 0 
to be equal to that of the overall population, hence to be identical across plans. 
This assumption is justified if patients are indifferent between all "active" physi 
cians (as made precise below) and choose among them randomly, as will be true at 
equilibrium. Given the set of proposed plans Uak ,bk ,pk ),k e K\ the set of plans 
that can be chosen both by physicians and patients at equilibrium is determined as 
follows.15 
Given the set of proposed schemes j I ak, bk J |, each physician determines his 
choice under homogeneous expectations.16 Denote by Bk the set of the types of the 
physicians who choose plan k. Since contracts are exclusive, the sets j Bk \ form a 
partition17 of the set of possible types. A plan is said to be active if it is chosen by 
a non negligible set of physicians and patients. The quality of care provided by an 
active plan k is given by ?'= E \l[ak, /?)\? e Bk; 1. 
Patients' choice is determined by the expected quality of care, net of premiums. 
At the time they choose a plan, although they do not know their health status, 
they make conjectures about the quality provided by the physicians in each plan. 
If they correctly assume physicians' choice to be determined as described above, 
they expect the quality of care provided by physicians in active plan k to be Lk. 
Now, patients, who are identical ex ante, all derive the same utility from any plan k 
(i.e., uk = ?Lk - pk ), and all choose among those that give them the highest level. 
15. The selection can be seen as the result of an adaptive process that takes place in real time, or only in 
agents mind. 
16. Note that the value of joining plan k for a j3-physician is given by viak ,bk ,?\ where Vis defined 
by equation (3) in section 2.3 : V (a, b; ?) 
= 
(b + (a-w)T(a,?) + ah (a, ?)) n 
. 
17. We consider here distinct contracts, so that the set of physicians who are indifferent between 
contracts is negligible. If two identical contracts are proposed, as examined in next section, physi 
cians are simply allocated randomly between the HOs. 
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Therefore, plans that do not yield the highest level, if any, are eliminated, and a new 
allocation of the physicians among the restricted set of plans is determined. Hence, 
at equilibrium, all patients expect the same utility from any physician of any active 
plan. Thus, if patients choose randomly among the physicians, physicians homoge 
neous 
expectations are correct. The described process leads to a set of active plans 
that satisfy the following definition: 
Definition 3. A set of distinct plans \lak,bk,pk),keK\ are active under homo 
geneous expectations if 
1. (physicians choice) plan k is chosen by the physicians whose characteristics 
are in Bk = 
i?W(ak,bk;?)> V(ak'9bk';?)vk'\ and f(#?t)>0. 
2. (patients choice) patients utility level is identical across active HO: 
uk 
=?Eh(ak,?)\?eBk -p =u for all active k. A clientele of size 
nF [B \ subscribes to plan k 
3. (feasibility) total premiums are larger than total payments to physicians: 
Equilibrium imposes quite severe constraints. To see this assume that some regu 
lation prohibits any price (premium) discrimination across different plans. This is 
roughly the situation in the Dutch health insurance system after the Dekker reform: 
(some) individuals may choose between different insurance funds, each of which 
selects a list of physicians, but the premium paid by each individual is independent 
of this choice. In the complement case, two distinct plans cannot be active without 
price discrimination. The intuition is straightforward. Take two contracts with say 
ak < ak . Physicians who choose ak work less than those who choose the more 
powerful contract ak' (incentive effect). In the complement case, they have lower 
values of ? (selection effect). But since quality increases with time and character 
istic, both effects go in the same direction: the average quality in plan k is strictly 
lower than in A;'. So consumers can perfectly rank physicians in terms of expected 
quality, by observing the contracts they have chosen. If they pay an identical fee for 
any physician they consult, no consumer would get services from doctors known 
to provide a lower quality. 
5.2 Cross Subsidies 
This section considers a public monopoly that introduces several contracts, and 
may implement cross-subsidies between plans. This means that the overall feasibil 
ity constraint is required, but some plans may generate a deficit. 
The set of contracts that can be implemented is quite large. To see this, take any 
set of schemes (ak,bk). Physicians self select themselves into a partition <Bk >, 
according to their expected utility level V (as in 1 of definition 3). Exclude con 
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tracts that no physician chooses. By charging adequate premiums, exactly those 
contracts can be active: the partition determines the average quality Lk within each 
plan k, and the premium is fixed at pk = XLk 
? u for each k, where u is set so as to 
satisfy feasibility (hence 2 and 3 of definition 3 are also satisfied). Notice that the 
budget of each single plan is not necessarily balanced. 
In our analysis of reform under political constraints, section 4, physicians utility 
had to be greater, for a sufficiently large proportion of them, than their status quo 
utility level, obtained under the unique scheme ia?,b? ). In line with this analysis, 
we investigate the case of a monopoly which introduces contracts in addition to the 
initial status quo contract, and charges premiums according to the implementation 
strategy just described. To keep notation simple, we investigate the addition of a 
single contract iax,bx J. We ask whether this initial contract (a?,b? J may be com 
pleted with an additional contract (ax,bx), while increasing patients satisfaction. 
Since by assumption the initial contract is offered, each physician is at least as well 
off than at the status quo. Accordingly, if patients welfare is also increased, every 
one benefits from the introduction of the new contract. This also implies that the 
two plans will be active if the situation is blocked at the status quo when unanimity 
is required. An important point to notice is that, as soon as an additional plan is 
introduced and active, the premium associated to the initial contract (a?,b? j must 
be modified. 
Thanks to linear utilities the sum of the physicians- patients welfare derived 
from a contract chosen by the set of physicians characteristics in Bx is 
w(ax,Bx} 
= n f W(a\?)f{?)d? where W(a,?), the expected social sur 
plus of a relation between a patient with a /3-physician who faces a rate a, is 
given by equation (6). For each physician ? who remains with the status quo 
plan, the utility level is the same, and the surplus W(a?,?) is not modified 
either. Hence, noticing that W^a?,?) 
= 
W^a0,B0]j 
+ 
w([a0,Bx)j, simple 
com 
putations give the potential utility gain A U due to the introduction of an addi 
tional contract as: 
AU = 
w(ax,Bx)-W(a?,Bx)-nf { {v[al ,bx ,?)~v[a? ,b? ,?)]jf(?)d?. 
The first term represents the variation in welfare due to a change in the fee a, 
which is made over physicians who opt for B1; if a1 is closer than a? to aFB, it is 
positive. However, the second term is also positive, since it represents the gain in 
physicians utility who opt for B1 or, equivalently, the informational cost. As before, 
the informational cost may be written as the compensating variation associated 
with the change of a from a0 to a1: 
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(19) AU = 
w(ax,Bl)-W(a?,Bx)-nJ ^bx-b(ax,?)\f{?)d?. 
The following proposition states that there always exists an additional contract 
(a],bx ) such that A U is positive. 
Proposition 4. Let a1 be a welfare improving fee for service (say a1 is between 
aFBanda?). The introduction of an additional contract la ,b]) increases patients 
welfare, provided that b1 is not too high. 
As explained above, patients welfare is increased if the informational cost, 
the second term in equation (19) is smaller than the welfare gains, the first 
term in equation (19). Consider bx the minimum level required to attract some 
physicians (if ax <a?, these physicians are the ones who work the least, say of 
type ? in the complement case): Bl is empty. As bl increases from this minimal 
value, Bl is small. The basic idea is that when Bl is small, physicians popula 
tion within Bl is homogeneous. This implies that the marginal informational 
cost as bl increases from this minimal value is equal to zero. Nevertheless, the 
marginal benefit is strictly positive, since efficiency gains are made over all 
physicians at the margin (of positive measure fi?) in the complement case). If 
bl increases more, the size of the new HO and the marginal informational cost 
increases. At some point, the informational cost may offset the welfare gain if 
Bl is too large (which is surely the case if the initial situation is blocked). 
Notice that, in the complement case and for a] < a0, the average quality in HO1 
is lower than in HO0, both by an incentive effect on practice time iax < a0 ) and 
by a selection effect (physicians who opt for HO1 are those with lower values 
of ?). Since patients utility increases, this means that/?1 must be lower than the 
premium at the status quo. But the selection effect also implies that the average 
quality within HO0 has increased. It may or may not be the case that p? is larger 
than at the status quo. 
5.3 Competition 
Cross subsidies may be difficult to implement in practice. In a context of phy 
sician heterogeneity, competition between several health organizations may be 
another more natural way of introducing several contracts. This section analyzes 
a competition game with free entry, in which HOs compete for patients and phy 
sicians. The specification of such a two-sided competition game is the following 
one. First health organizations propose plans. Second, given the set of proposed 
plans, the active plans, the physicians' choice, and the patients utility are deter 
mined. 
We study Nash equilibria in plans. Let iak,bk,pk ) k = 1,.., Kbe proposed, and 
u be the patients utility level reached at the equilibrium allocation (identical across 
active plans). A HO, say HOx, takes other plans as given, and contemplates a devia 
tion {a,b,p). In doing so, it considers the new equilibrium allocation of physicians 
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and patients. There are two possible cases to consider. In the first case, contract 
{a,b) attracts all physicians whose characteristics are in B' c B, and patients get 
exactly the level u, that is the premium/? satisfies /> = ? ?L?a,?\? e B')\-u. So 
the profit generated by a contract {a, b,p) is given by 
(20) 7r{a,b,u,B') = nj [AL{a,?)-u-aT{a,?)-b]f{?)d? 
In the second case, patients get strictly more than u and contract {a,b) is taken 
by all physicians.18 Therefore the profit is 7t{a,b,u + s,B) for some positive s, 
where n is the function defined by (20). 
At equilibrium, no single HO may increase its profit by deviating from the 
proposed plans. In principle, both kinds of equilibrium may occur: either all 
active plans are identical19 (a pooling equilibrium), or some are distinct (a sepa 
rating equilibrium). However, the following proposition shows that neither may 
occur. 
Proposition 5. Under physicians heterogeneity, no equilibrium exists in the com 
petition game. 
That no pooling equilibrium exists follows from the following standard argu 
ments. First if a unique plan {a,b,p) is proposed, possibly by several HOs sharing 
randomly physicians and patients, the expected profit of the plan must be null, 
thanks to free entry. Hence 7t{a,b,u,B) 
= 0. Second, owing to physicians hetero 
geneity surely 7r{a,b,u,B') > 0 for a well chosen subset B'. Thanks to the single 
crossing property of physicians indifference curves (proposition 2), a new plan can 
be offered that precisely attracts physicians with characteristics in B'. Therefore 
adjusting the premium so as to give utility level u yields a profitable deviation. 
That no separating equilibrium exists is reminiscent of competition in differenti 
ated products ? la Hotelling: Health organizations compete for the "center" of the 
market, which is given by the first best contract. To see this, let us assume several 
distinct plans be active at an equilibrium. The less powerful one (with the small 
est a, say ax) attracts physicians who work the less. The fact that a HO's strategy 
is composed with a scheme (a,6) and a premium/? allows HO1 to adjust the fee 
for service a while attracting the same set of physicians and keeping unmodified 
the patients utility level. Furthermore, since physicians within HO1 work less than 
in any other HO, HO1 may increase a and decrease b (keeping the utility of the 
marginal physician constant) in such a way that the rent left to all physicians with 
18. Such a corner strategy plays an important role in the study of competition among intermediaries. 
As first shown by Yanelle (1989), an intermediary may benefit from competing hard on one side of 
the market, here the patients, in order to be in a monopoly position on the other side (see Armstrong 
(2002) for a recent survey on competition in two sided markets). 
19. If all physicians in B' choose contract (a,b)n(a,b,B') is the profit of the HO. If the contract is 
proposed by several HOs, then each gets a fraction of n(a,b,B) (it is not necessary to specify more 
here). 
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characteristics in Bl decreases. If a1 was smaller than aFB, such a strategy20 would 
both improve efficiency and decrease the physicians rent, hence would increase 
profit. Therefore at a Nash equilibrium, the fee for service of the "less powerful" 
contract, that is the smallest a, must be larger than aFB. A similar argument shows 
that the largest a must be smaller than cf3'. this gives the contradiction. Health 
organizations compete for the center of the market, and these centrifugal forces 
destabilize any separating equilibrium. 
Remark. Consider a regulated competition, in which each HO must leave 
patients with a minimum utility level21 denoted by ?. Under this regulation, 
the set of available strategies is smaller since the premium asked by k must sat 
isfy pk < ?E\ LI ak,? 1 \? e Bk -u. So one could hope to restore the existence 
of an equilibrium. However, as the proof makes clear, whatever plans, one HO 
has a profitable deviation in which the patients 
' 
utility levels is left unmodified. 
Thus an equilibrium does not exist either under this form of regulated competi 
tion. 
6 Conclusion 
Our analysis shows that political constraints severely restrict the possibility of 
reforming payment schemes. Indeed, due to imperfectly observable (or not con 
tractible) medical practice, rents have to be left to physicians. When physicians 
practice is heterogeneous and does not respond much to incentives, the increase in 
the rent necessary to get a reform supported may outweigh efficiency gains. 
We focused our analysis on physicians, but believe our analysis extends to other 
professions, for which the crucial importance of the service, together with the diffi 
culty to observe the output quality, has justified regulation. Beyond medical profes 
sions, examples include train drivers (especially in France) or air traffic controllers. 
In such areas, past regulation has given professionals a strong political power and 
a very high status quo position. Our analysis may provide an explanation of the 
difficulties to reform such professions. 
If physician heterogeneity determines the difficulty of payment scheme 
reforms, this suggests that the introduction of flexibility, in the form of a menu 
of contracts among which physicians may self-select, could be worth a try, by 
reducing the cost of information asymmetries. However, the analysis has shown 
that the introduction of competition may not be an easy solution. The specific ele 
20. The profit over a fixed set of physicians characteristics B' keeping u constant can be decomposed 
as in the previous section into welfare gains minus a rent to be left to the physicians with character 
istics in Bl (see the proof for more details). 
21. This level may be given by the outside option value of not getting insured (and receiving no care) 
at all: if we denote by 1(0) the "quality of no care", i.e. T (Q) 
= I (0,Q, ?) which is independent of/? 
since t = 0, the utility level under no insurance is: XE?I (0)]. Regulation may also impose a higher 
patients utility level than their reservation value. 
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ment that renders competition difficult to implement is that patients can choose 
between the different plans. Free choice, together with rational expectations, puts 
strong constraints on the links between the premium and average provided qual 
ity not only within a given plan, but also across the various plans. This difficulty 
directly stems from the fact that three types of "agents" intervene in the system: 
physicians, patients, and health organizations. Competition gives an important 
role to health organizations and creates some room for divergence of interests 
between insurance firms and patients interests. Any solution needs to integrate 
these conflicting interests, by implementing appropriate cross subsidies between 
alternative contracts. A monopolistic firm could, in principle, implement such a 
scheme. 
Much has still to be understood in the way regulated competition between health 
organizations could work in this "medical triad", and provide a way to reduce 
the cost due to imperfectly observable medical practice. In particular, an interest 
ing question is whether the cross subsidies studied in the last section could be 
introduced in a competitive setting. Cross subsidies could take the form of "qual 
ity-compensation" mechanisms, that would compensate patients for differences 
in quality across different health organizations. Additional research is needed to 
study a game in which firms compete in contracts, given such quality compensa 
tion mechanisms. 
We left aside the important issue of patients selection by physicians or by health 
organizations. Patients selection should be studied in an extended set up where the 
physician-patient matching is no longer random but endogenous. 
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Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 2 
1. Deriving the first order condition (2): R'U* \ - w - alAt \0,?\ with respect 
to/?, straightforwardly gives that if talent and time are substitutes (lt? < o) optimal 
time t {a,0,?) decreases with?. 
2. Let Rl be steeper than R2 (i.e., a >a ). From (2) again, increasing the mar 
ginal reward a for all t shifts the marginal benefit of t upwards, hence increases t*: 
so 
t*(ax,0,?)>t(a2,0,?). 
Denote by ? {?) the difference in expected utility associated with the two schemes 
for a ^ -physician: A{?) 
= 
V{R],?)-V{R2,?) where Fis given by (3): 
V{R\?) = nEeUl(t(a\0,?)Yw(t(a\0 . 
Ay?-physician prefers Rl to R2, if A{?) > 0. The derivative of A with respect to 
?, thanks to the envelope theorem, is given by 
A\?) = 
naE0^l?^(ax;0,?);0,?yi?^(a2;0,?),0,?) 
. 
If talent and time are substitutes, lt? < 0, and we know that 
t* (ax ,0,?)>t* (a2,0,?): A' is negative, hence A is decreasing. Soif a ^ -physi 
cian prefers Rl to R2, we have A(/?') > A{?) > 0 for any ?' < ?. This proves that 
any physician with a lower characteristic than ?, who works more than the ^ -phy 
sician, also prefers Rx to R2. The proof is similar in the complement case, with A 
increasing. 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Differentiating V with respect to a, we have that Va {a,b;?) 
= 
nT{a,?). This 
gives: 
Wjn = Ua+E?[Va(aM?)] 
= 
Edj[M/a-t*-at:] + E?[T(aJ)] 
= 
E0,?[m-a)tl-t'] 
+ 
Eet?[t*] 
= 
E0t?[m-a)tl]. 
Since lt ={w- a) j a and a 
= 
w?/{a + ?), we obtain: 
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Wa(a) = 
n[^y"-a)E?[Ta(aJ)]. 
As for the informational cost it suffices to use that Va{a,b;?) = nT{a,?) for 
any/?. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
If we denote by ju the Lagrange multiplier associated with the political constraint 
Vya,b;?c ) 
> VI a?,b?;?c j, the first order condition that characterizes an interior 
solution to problem (10) is defined by: 
nUa+MVa(a,b;?c) 
= 0 
< 
nUb+MVb(aM?c) 
= 0 
Since fixed payments are simply payments from patients to physicians, we 
immediately have that Ub 
= 
-1 and Vb 
= n, leading to ju = \. The first condition 
nUa + Va (a,b; ?c I = 0 may be written as: 
nUa+E?[Va(a,b;?)]-E?[Va(a,b,?)] 
+ 
Va(a,b;?c) 
= 0 
Wa{a)-Ca(a,?c) 
= 0 
Substituting the computed values for Wa and Ca gives the result when the opti 
mal value for a is interior. However, C is not differentiate at a0: its left derivative 
is equal to Ca (a?,?d ) and its right derivative to Ca la?,?u ). Therefore it may be 
the case that the marginal cost outweighs the marginal benefit for small changes in 
either direction. Formally, this happens when Ca (a?,?d )<Wa(a?)< Ca (a?,?u ). 
Hence the result. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Given an equilibrium let u be the patients utility level. The "profit" generated in 
a HO by a physician of type ? is given by: 
7r{a,b,?) 
= 
n[AL{a,?)-u-aT{a,?)-b~\. 
(1) We first prove that no pooling equilibrium exists. 
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Let {a,b) be the identical contract proposed by the two HO. Since contracts 
are identical, physicians are indifferent between two health organizations; they are 
distributed randomly between the different organizations, and the characteristics of 
the physicians subscribing to each HO is identical, equal to the prior distribution of 
?. Let sk be the size of HOk. The profit of HOk is equal to: /;r (a, 6, [/?,/?]) (note 
that we do not exclude sk = 0, i.e. a monopoly). 
The argument proceeds in two steps. 
Step 1. The profit of each HO is null. 
The argument is similar to competition ? la Bertrand. Assume that nx, the profit 
of HO1, is strictly positive. If HO2 deviates by increasing a little bit the fixed pay 
ment b and lowering its premium, it attracts all physicians and all patients, and 
thereby captures almost all HOhs profit. Hence the case nx > 0 is not compatible 
with a pooling equilibrium. 
Step 2. A HO by selecting some physicians can make a positive profit. 
Since the profit of each HO is null, we have that: 
x(a,b,[?,?]) = \?n(a,b,?)f{?)d? 
= 0. 
Since 7i is not constant with respect ?, there is an interval, say \?,?'1, 
such that 
7t{a,b,?)f{?)d? is not null. Assume it to be positive (otherwise consider 
\?',?\ ). This means that the contract {a,b) generates a strictly positive profit if 
(1) it is only chosen by the physicians with characteristics in [/?,/?'] and (2) the 
premium to the patients is fixed accordingly, i.e. p 
- 
AL{a,?)-?. We now show 
that it is possible to modify the contract at the margin so as to attract only these 
physicians. Let d <a in the complement case, and a' <a in the substitute case. 
Choose b' so as to make a /?'-phy sitian indifferent between (a,b) and {a',b'). 
Then all physicians with a lower ? strictly prefer {a\b') to {a,b). By choosing a 
sufficiently close to a, the profit of the plan is close to /r?a,&,[/?,/?']), which is 
strictly positive. So there is a profitable deviation. 
Notice that this possibility is a direct consequence of the single-crossing property 
of physicians indifference curves over contracts {a, b). This completes the first part 
of the proof: no pooling equilibrium exists. 
(2) We now prove that no separating equilibrium exists. 
Let (ax ,bx 1 and la2,b2 1 be two distinct active contracts (possibly within other 
contracts), with a1 being the smallest a, and a2 the largest. If there exists a separat 
ing equilibrium, we have ax > a2. Physicians who work less (with lower values of 
T) will join HOK 
If both are active there exists an interior ?' such that physicians with ? smaller 
than ?' join HO1, and those with ? larger than ?' join HO2, or the reverse. More 
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precisely Bl = \?,?\ 
in the complement case and Bl = \?\?\ 
in tne substitute 
case. 
We consider marginal deviations from lax,bx ) that leave the set of physicians 
who choose either HO unchanged. Such deviations leave the /^'-physician indif 
ferent between the two contracts, and keep a fee for service smaller than a2. Hence, 
such changes {a,b) from la1 ,bl J induce no selection effect, but only "pure" incen 
tive effects: They satisfy the constraints 
(21) V{a,b,?') 
= 
v(a2,b2,?,S), 
and a < a2. 
Since Vb=n and Va=nT{a,?), such a marginal change satisfies 
Since by construction the level of patients welfare is kept constant, the HO profit 
varies as the surplus over a fixed set of physicians. More precisely the following 
identity always holds 
w(a,Bx)) 
= U + 
7r(a,b,B])) + v(a,b,Bx)) 
where c/is the utility level of the patients that subscribe to HO1. By construction, 
the premium is adjusted so that U = nFyBx \u is kept constant. So maximizing 
profit amounts to maximizing welfare WlaBx ) under the constraints (21). 
Computation and interpretation are similar to those performed in the monopoly 
section (lemma 1) simply by replacing the whole interval of characteristics B by Bx. 
This immediately gives the marginal change in profit 
?7T 
da 
a + ? 
?a da 
V H,db 
a (aFB-a)jBJa(a,?)f(?)d? + njBl[T(a,?')-T(aJ)]f(?)d? 
As in the monopoly case, this equation gives the marginal change in profit as the 
sum of efficiency gains (if a gets closer to aFB) and informational costs (changes 
in the rent left to physicians) within the HO. All physicians in HOx work less than 
the ?f physician. So the term T{a,?f)-T(a,?) is surely positive: increasing 
a and decreasing b decreases the overall payment to physicians. Since the marginal 
informational cost is positive, we must have, at a Nash equilibrium, that the mar 
ginal efficiency gain is negative, i.e. that iaFB -ax J 
< 0. 
Consider now HO2. The argument is reversed. All physicians in HO2 work 
more than the /?' physician. So the term T{a,?')-T{a,?\ is surely negative: 
decreasing a2 and increasing b decreases the overall physicians' welfare. So HO2 
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has no profitable deviation only if by decreasing a the surplus is decreased. At a 
Nash equilibrium, we must have that a2 < aFB. 
Starting with a1 < a2, we showed that nx increases with a1 as long as a1 < aFB , 
and n2 decreases with a2 as long as a2 < aFB. Hence, at a Nash equilibrium, we 
must have that a2 < aFB < ax, which contradicts the starting assumption a1 < a2. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Let a1 be between the first best and the status quo levels. Given (a0,b?\ and 
ax e aFB ,a? , we may parameterize Bl by /?', the type of the physician who is 
indifferent between B? and Bx. To fix the idea take the complement case: physicians 
with a low value of ? work less, therefore Bx = [/?,/?']. If bl is too small, then 
no 
physician would opt for Bx and only the initial contract would be active. We show 
that choosing bx higher than the minimal level but small enough does the job. By 
definition of ?', we have that bx =b\ax,?'\\ hence, from (19), the derivative of 
AU w.r.t. ?' in [?,?~\ 
is equal to: 
M.[Hr(.i./r)-Ir(.-./r)]W-f?^P(n 
The minimal level of bl that makes Bx active corresponds to ?' = ? For this 
value, the second term (i.e. the marginal information cost) is equal to zero, and: 
?AU 
d?' ?=? 
= 
[w(a\?)-W(a?,?)]f(?)>0. 
The inequality holds since, by assumption, a1 is closer to the first best than a?. At 
the margin, the informational cost to increase ?' starting from ? is zero, but the 
welfare gain is positive. Hence the result. 
The proof is similar in the substitute case, except that the new HO requires /?' 
to be sufficiently close to ?. 
